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The Standardised Digital Forensic Investigation Process 
Model (SDFIPM) 
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Abstract The field of digital forensics still lacks formal process models that courts 
can employ to determine the reliability of the process followed in a digital investi-
gation. The existing models have often been developed by digital forensic practi-
tioners, based on their own personal experience and on an ad-hoc basis, without 
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attention to the establishment of standardisation within the field. This has prevented 
the institution of the formal processes that are urgently required. Moreover, as dig-
ital forensic investigators often operate within different fields of law enforcement, 
commerce and incident response, the existing models have often tended to focus on 
one particular field and have failed to consider all the environments. This has hin-
dered the development of a generic model that can be applied in all the three stated 
fields of digital forensics. To address these shortcomings, this paper makes a novel 
contribution by proposing the Advanced Investigative Process Model (the 
SDFIPM) for Conducting Digital Forensic Investigations, encompassing the ‘mid-
dle part’ of the digital investigative process, which is formal in that it synthesizes, 
harmonises and extends the existing models, and which is generic in that it can be 
applied in the three fields of law enforcement, commerce and incident response.   
 
1. Introduction 
A digital forensic investigator might discover significant and incriminating evi-
dence, but if they cannot present the evidence in a coherent and understandable way 
to the lay audience (such as judge and jury), the case may be lost [1, 2]. The com-
plexity of tools and methodologies used to perform a digital investigative process 
requires investigators to be able to explain the process in a manner that a judge and 
jury can understand it [3]. Such tools and methodologies must also adhere to some 
standards of practice and be accepted by other investigators operating in the field 
[3, 4, 5].  Nevertheless, the field of digital forensics still lacks both consensus and 
formal process models that the courts can employ to determine the reliability of the 
digital evidence presented to them [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 
17, 18]. The absence of agreements associated with DFIPMs has been widely 
acknowledged also by other researchers [6, 7, 8, 9, 10], [14, 15, 16], [18, 19]. Zai-
nudin et al. [20] state that one of the most significant problems encountered by dig-
ital forensic investigators is the absence of standardisation in the field of digital 
forensics. 
 
Casey [21] argues that the development of a formal process model enables a com-
plete, rigorous investigation, ensures proper evidence handling and reduces the 
chances of mistakes created by preconceived theories, time pressures, and other po-
tential pitfalls [21]. Similarly, Valjarevic and Venter [15] state that conducting a 
digital forensic investigation requires a formalized process model, arguing, “There 
is currently neither an international standard nor does a global, harmonized DFI 
process (DFIP) exist”. Authors in [14] and [15] suggest the concept of a widely 
agreed-upon process model to harmonise the practice of digital forensics. However, 
despite many calls to bring formalisation to DFIPMs, a solution has not yet been 
provided [6, 7], [9, 10], [12], [14, 15, 16], [23]. Many researchers acknowledge the 
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limited progress, if any, in defining and improving a formal digital forensic process 
since the DFRWS held in 2001 [9, 10], [14], [18], [22], [24, 25].  
 
The existing models have often been developed by digital forensic investigators 
(DFIs) based on their own personal experience on an ad hoc basis without consid-
eration to establish standardisation within the field [15]. This has prevented the es-
tablishment of formal processes that are urgently needed by courts of law [9], [14]. 
In many cases, DFIs employ ad hoc tools [18], [26, 27, 28, 29] to carry out digital 
investigations. Therefore, many researchers are increasingly calling for scientific 
approaches and formal methods for describing the digital investigation processes 
[23], [30, 31, 32, 33]. Furthermore, the existing models often tend to focus on one 
area of digital forensics and neglect the other areas. This has hindered the develop-
ment of a generic model that can be applied in both law enforcement and corporate 
investigations [6], [9, 10]. The adoption of ad-hoc approaches in developing previ-
ous models has led to a variety of process models with conflicting stages, activities 
and terminology, which in turn has prevented the establishment of the formal pro-
cesses urgently needed by courts and investigators alike [14], [18].  
 
1.1 Research Problem and Contributions 
The foregoing considerations lead to the following research problem: 
 
There does not exist a comprehensive model encompassing the entire dig-
ital investigative process that is formal, such that it can assist a court of 
law in determining the reliability of the investigative process followed, and 
that is generic, in that it can be applied in the different fields of law en-
forcement, commerce and incident response. 
 
Therefore, the SDFIPM was designed and developed as the middle part (i.e. the 
Investigative Processes Class) of a larger, comprehensive model, the Comprehen-
sive Digital Forensic Investigation Process Model for Digital Forensic Practice, pre-
sented in [9], in order to contribute towards addressing the aforementioned short-
comings. The SDFIPM is formal in that it synthesises, harmonises and extends the 
existing models, and is generic in that it can be applied in the three fields of law 
enforcement, commerce and incident response. Moreover, we also propose a set of 
overriding principles included in the model that DFIs will need to employ during 
the investigative process in order to maximise the chances of the admissibility of 
digital evidence in a court of law. By implementing the SDFIPM and its Overriding 
Principles, this model will be of a great value to both DFIs and courts of law alike.  
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Note that in the context of this research study, the term ‘formal’ is not equivalent to 
the same term employed in the domains of Mathematics and Computer Science, in 
which the word ‘formal’ is used to refer to a set of strings of symbols that might be 
constrained by rules that are specific to it. In contrast, for the purposes of this study, 
the term ‘formal’ has been employed to refer to the UML Activity Diagrams, sci-
entific methods, standards of practice, consistency, structure, agreed-upon compo-
nents and terminology, harmonisation, and the unified approach that have been 
brought to the proposed model, the SDFIPM. 
 
1.2 Authors’ Note 
Prior to the design and development of the CDFIPM [9], of which the SDFIPM is 
the middle part of, all the prominent digital forensic investigation process models 
(DFIPMs) presented to date were critically reviewed. These models were then as-
sessed against three different sets of assessment criteria, including: the Daubert Test 
[34] Five-Point Requirement, Carrier and Spafford [35] Five-Point Requirement 
and Beebe and Clark [36] Four-Point Requirement. The aim of this critical review 
was to gain an in-depth insight into these models and identify which could contrib-
ute to our proposed model. Since law enforcement, commerce and incident response 
were the three environments on which this study focused, the existing models within 
those three domains which most closely met the assessment criteria were considered 
for their possible contributions to the new model. Such an approach is considered 
important by other researchers [16], [23], [37] as any model institutionalized 
through subsequent intellectual discourse and practical use must take into account 
other researchers’ perspectives, approaches and “vernacular”. 
 
In order to assess the previous models against the three sets of assessment criteria, 
each model was given three sets of scores in accordance with the three sets of as-
sessment criteria. Models were scored according to how many of the requirements 
were met for each particular set of criteria. This method of assessing the previous 
DFIPMs against ‘three’ different criteria is another novel contribution of this re-
search in the field of digital forensic science. It should be noted that Carrier and 
Spafford’s [35] five-point requirements have also been used by Beebe and Clark 
[36], against which they assess their own model (even though they do not provide 
scores). Likewise, Adams [4] uses both Carrier and Spafford’s [35] five-point re-
quirements as well as the Daubert Test’s five-point requirements against which he 
evaluates the previous DFIPMs. However, we have built upon the previous initia-
tives in five different ways. First, we included Beebe and Clark’s [36] four-point 
requirements, which to our best knowledge have not been previously used by any 
other researchers as an assessment method against which the exiting DFIPMs are 
evaluated. Second, we have approached the review and assessment of the previous 
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models differently. For instance, the scores that we have given each model based 
on the three sets of assessment criteria might be completely different from those 
given by Adams [4] based on the two sets of assessment criteria they have used. 
Third, contrary to Adams questioning the reliability of the Daubert Test in assessing 
the previous models, we have demonstrated that the Daubert Test is in fact effective 
in judging the previous DFIPMs. Fourth, we have analysed the most up-to-date 
models (in addition to the older ones) up to 2014 including Adam’s own model 
presented both in [4] and [38]. Fifth, we have assessed our own model, the 
CDFIPM, the evaluation of which will be presented in an upcoming study, against 
the three sets of assessment criteria.   
 
The results of our critical review of the previous DFIPMs have been presented in 
our previous studies such as in [6], [9], [13, 14]. Therefore, since this research paper 
builds upon our previous studies, we have borrowed some information in the Intro-
duction and Background Sections of this paper from those studies, with references 
being made to those past studies. 
 
1.3 Structure of the Paper 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the research 
background. Section 3 presents the literature review while Section 4 provides the 
methodology employed to conduct the research presented in this paper. The pro-
posed model is presented in Section 5, followed by the description of the SDFIPM’s 
overriding principles in Section 5. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section 6.  
 
3. Literature Review 
Based upon our notes in the sub-section 1.2, this section provides a short summary 
in relation to our critical review of the previous DFIPMs. As Table 1 clearly demon-
strates, existing DFIPMs display significant disparities in terms of the number of 
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Table 1. The comparative summary of the existing DFIPMs 





















































































































































































































Readiness    ✔ ✔  ✔ ✔    ✔       ✔  
Deployment    ✔   ✔ ✔           ✔  
Policy/ Procedure          ✔  ✔       ✔  
Operational Readiness    ✔   ✔     ✔       ✔  
Infrastructure Readiness    ✔   ✔     ✔       ✔  
Incident Detection (Awareness)   ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔      ✔      ✔ ✔  
Report Incident (Notification)    ✔ ✔ ✔  ✔  ✔    ✔     ✔  
Assess Incident.        ✔     ✔      ✔  
Confirm Incident.    ✔ ✔  ✔      ✔ ✔     ✔  
Authorisation    ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔   ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔   ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Incident Response    ✔   ✔ ✔ ✔   ✔      ✔   
Planning (Approach Strategy)   ✔   ✔  ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔   ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Understand Task Requirements                     ✔ 
Determine Overall Picture                    ✔ 
Determine Required Outcomes                    ✔ 
Determine Parameters                    ✔ 
Consider Physical Constraint                    ✔ 
Consider Timing Constraint                    ✔ 
Consider Data Constraint                    ✔ 
Plan Logistics                    ✔ 
Create Outline Plan                 ✔   ✔ 
Preparation   ✔     ✔  ✔       ✔ ✔   
Attend Site           ✔      ✔   ✔ 
Securing the Scene   ✔     ✔         ✔    
Address Safety Issues                 ✔   ✔ 
Communication Shielding                 ✔    
Triage           ✔          
Examine User Usage Profiles           ✔          
Examine Chronology Timeline           ✔          
 
To be continued … 
 
7 





















































































































































































































Examine Browsing Activities         ✔  ✔          
Case Specifics           ✔          
Carry Out Preliminary Survey                    ✔ 
Documentation of Scene    ✔  ✔  ✔         ✔ ✔  ✔ 
Update Outline Plan                 ✔   ✔ 
Search    ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔  ✔       ✔  ✔  
Survey    ✔ ✔  ✔ ✔         ✔    
Identification ✔     ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔     ✔  ✔ ✔   
Preservation ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔  ✔ ✔       ✔ ✔ ✔  ✔  
Collection ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔  ✔ ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Volatile Evidence Collection         ✔   ✔     ✔    
Non-Volatile Evidence Collection         ✔   ✔         
Authenticate                   ✔  
Seizure        ✔           ✔ ✔ 
Package                 ✔   ✔ 
Transport      ✔    ✔     ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Storage      ✔    ✔     ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Examination ✔  ✔ ✔  ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔   ✔  ✔  ✔  ✔  
Harvest        ✔    ✔       ✔  
Reduce        ✔    ✔       ✔  
Identify    ✔               ✔  
Classify                   ✔  
Organise            ✔       ✔  
Compare                   ✔  
Analysis ✔  ✔ ✔    ✔ ✔ ✔   ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔  
Attribute               ✔    ✔  
Evaluate                   ✔  
 
To be continued 
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Hypothesis      ✔             ✔  
Interpretation               ✔    ✔  
Reconstruction    ✔ ✔  ✔ ✔    ✔   ✔    ✔  
Reporting  ✔  ✔    ✔ ✔   ✔  ✔   ✔    
Presentation  ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔  ✔   ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔  
Proof / Defence      ✔  ✔  ✔           
Decision ✔       ✔           ✔  
Review    ✔ ✔  ✔ ✔         ✔  ✔  
Dissemination      ✔  ✔           ✔  
Returning Evidence   ✔     ✔     ✔       ✔ 
Digital Crime Scene Investigation    ✔ ✔  ✔ ✔             
Physical Crime Scene Investigation    ✔ ✔  ✔           ✔ ✔  
Documentation    ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔     ✔     ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Preserving Chain of Custody      ✔ ✔     ✔        ✔ 
Preserving Digital Evidence      ✔  ✔          ✔   
Information Flow      ✔            ✔   
Case Management      ✔       ✔        
 
End of the Table 
 
 
The result of this review revealed a gap that there does not exist a comprehensive 
model for digital forensic investigations that can be widely accepted by the digital 
forensic community and courts of the law. The previous models have often been 
criticised for being too specific [35], [39] too high level [36], too broad [19], too 
technical [40] and too complex [41]. These models are considered to be ad hoc tools 
as opposed to formal models [18], [22, 23, 24], [26], [36], [39], [42, 43, 44, 45].  
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Presenting the review and assessment of these models is outside the scope of this 
paper. The reader, instead, is encouraged to refer to the studies presented in [6], [9, 
10, 11], [13, 14] to consult this review. 
 
As shown in the next table (Table 2), assessing the previous models against the 
Beebe and Clark [36] criteria reveal that there are five models that meet three of the 
four criteria, while six and five models fulfil two and one out of the four criteria 
respectively. There are also three models that meet no criteria, while there is one 
model to which the assessment criteria are not applicable. Similarly, comparing the 
previous models against the Carrier and Spafford [35] criteria reveals that there is 
one model that fulfils all the five criteria, while there are four other models that 
meet four of the criteria.  There are also four, seven and three models that meet 
three, two and one out of the five criteria respectively, while there is one model to 
which the assessment criteria are not applicable. In relation to the Daubert Test [34], 
there are two models that fulfil four and three of the five criteria respectively, while 
three models meet two of the criteria.  There are also twelve and two models that 
meet one and no criteria respectively, while there is one model to which the assess-
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Table 1. Scores obtained by the previous models based on the three assessment 
criteria 
 Scores 











Electronic Crime Scene Investigation: A Guide 




Abstract Digital Forensic Model (Reith et al., 
2002) 
2 4 1 
Integrated Digital Investigation Process (Carrier 




Digital Crime Scene Analysis (Rogers, 2004) 3 
 
4 2 
Enhanced Digital Investigation Process Model 




An Extended Model of Cybercrime Investigation  




Hierarchical, Objectives Based Framework for 





Four Step Forensic Process (Kent et al., 2006) 2 
 
3 0 
Computer Forensics Field Triage Process Model  




Framework for a Digital Forensic Investigation 




A Common Process Model for Incident Response 





Two Dimensional Evidence Reliability Amplifi-




Mapping Process of Digital Forensic Investiga-
tion Framework (Selamat et al., 2008) 
0 1 1 
Digital Forensic Process Model (Cohen, 2009) 2 
 
2 1 
Generic Computer Forensics Investigation Model 




Systematic Digital Forensic Investigation Model 




Harmonised Digital Forensic Investigation Pro-
cess Model 




Integrated Digital Forensic Process Model (Kohn 
et al., 2013) 
2 2 1 
The Advanced Data Acquisition Process Model 





Analysing the results of the Beebe and Clark [36], Carrier and Spafford [35] and 
the Daubert Test [34] criteria applied to each of the models identified those that 
include the components suggested by the three aforementioned criteria as necessary 
for a DFIPM.  In total, there were eight models that were selected for their possible 
contributions to the CDFIPM based on their high scores achieved in relation to 
meeting the three sets of the assessment criteria.   
 
3. Overview of the Investigative Process Model 
The SDFIPM, which is considered to be a “class” and the middle part of the larger 
model CDFIPM (presented in its entirety in our upcoming study, has been designed 
using a top-down approach in order to enable digital forensic investigators to gain 
a better insight into its compositional components, namely Processes, Phases, Sub-
Phases and Overriding Principles. There are 7 processes contained within the 
SDFIPM, each of which contains a different number of Phases. Apart the Overrid-
ing Principles, i.e. Concurrent Processes, which do not provide lower-level details, 
the remainder of the Processes provide additional lower layers of details, i.e. Phases 
and Sub-Phases. The SDFIPM will be initially presented in its abstract level, prior 
to being refined with more details that make up the model’s lowest-level structure. 
Figure 1 represents the first instance of the formal representation of the SDFIPM in 
its abstract level, containing the first layers of the SDFIPM, namely Processes. Fol-
lowing this abstract representation, each process of the SDFIPM, containing second 
and third layer details, i.e. Phases and Sub-Phases, will then be represented by a 
UML Activity Diagram. The combination of all UML Activity Diagrams depicted 
in Figures 2-8 makes up the entire SDFIPM. Each Process will be subsequently 
discussed under their associated main headings. 
 
Notice that this version of the SDFIPM’s formal representation (Figure 1 and Fig-
ures 2-8) as well as its Overriding Principles presented in this paper are prior to their 
submission to the external reviewers for evaluation and feedback presented and dis-
cussed in our upcoming paper. 
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Figure 1. The UML Activity Diagram of Investigative Class Processes in their abstract level 
 
3.1 Examination Process 
The largest amount of investigation time is spent on the Examination Process as 
well as the Analysis Process (discussed later). During this Process, a large number 
of techniques need to be used in order to access, find and extract the acquired data 
representing the potential digital evidence into a human-readable format. Authors 
of many of the existing DFIPMs such as Carrier and Spafford [35] state that there 
should be one single Phase assigned to the Examination and Analysis activities. 
They argue that these Phases can be confusing as their meaning is only slightly 
different, and it is common to have two investigators who are referring to the same 





































































































































































































































This argument is invalid on the basis that the Examination and Analysis stages have 
different aims and therefore should be assigned two separate Processes. The Exam-
ination Phase should involve activities regarding the extraction of potential digital 
evidence from the acquired data, whereas the Analysis Phase should involve those 
activities associated with the methodical analysis of digital evidence as well as the 
construction of the incident. Therefore, in the SDFIPM, the Examination and Anal-
ysis have been assigned two separate processes with their own lower-level phases 
and sub-phase. This approach is supported by Casey [21], who states “Examination 
is the process of extracting and viewing information from the evidence and making 
it available for analysis”, whereas “Analysis is the application of the scientific 
method and critical thinking to address the fundamental questions in an investiga-
tion: who, what, where, when, how, and why”. 
 
Figure 2 represents the UML Activity Diagram of the SDFIPM’s Examination Pro-
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Figure 2. The UML Activity Diagram of the Examination Process 
 
3.1.1 Survey Digital Crime Scene 
The Survey Digital Crime Scene Phase has been developed and included in the Ex-
amination Process to enable DFAs to find apparent pieces of digital evidence for a 
particular category of crime in a swift manner, and also to assist them in ascertaining 
the skill level of the suspect.  Determining the suspect’s skill level in turn will allow 
DFAs to decide what examination and analysis techniques are required in the next 
process of the SDFIPM, the Analysis Process (discussed later).  During the Exami-
nation Process, the first step that investigators will need to undertake is to survey 
the digital crime scene to identify and locate potential evidence, possibly within 
unconventional locations on the system [46]. It is preferable to carry out the Survey 
Digital Crime Scene Phase in a DFL as it provides a controlled environment, and 
the results can be repeated with another copy of the system. To carry out this Phase 
in a DFL, DFAs must use the image (working copy) of the system acquired from 
the Acquisition and Collection Process as shown in [7].      
 
However, in certain circumstances, investigators employing the SDFIPM might be 
required to perform this phase on a live system to determine whether or not the 
system should be brought back to a DFL for a full examination and analysis.  In 




Output from the Ac-














Go/input to the 
Analysis Process. 
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into what Carrier and Spafford [35] call a “trusted environment”. In cases where the 
Survey Digital Crime Scene Phase is to be conducted on a live system, the SDFIPM 
still requires the investigators to image the system so that any digital evidence could 
also be acquired in a controlled DFL environment. Whether the Survey Digital 
Crime Scene Phase is to be carried out on a live system or in a controlled DFL 
environment, DFAs must adapt their investigative techniques based on the specific 
category of crime. This is to expedite the subsequent Examination and Analysis 
activities as there is often a large volume of data to deal with.   
 
For instance, in cases where the computer has been used to store or distribute con-
traband images, DFAs must in the first place look for graphics with image file ex-
tensions and ascertain those that could be relied upon as incriminating evidence. 
Another example includes server intrusion where investigators should search for 
apparent signs of a rootkit installation, examine application logs and also search for 
new configuration files. In other types of investigations such as terrorism where 
investigators suspect that the system might contain the communication by the sus-
pect, investigators must perform keyword searching to identify any leads related to 
the investigation. Yet another example derived from [35] is when analysing network 
traffic about an incident; the Survey Digital Crime Scene Phase might analyse traf-
fic for the incident time frame and filter out certain ports and hosts.  In other cases, 
as suggested in [46], the investigators should also analyse the “common” and “un-
common” locations on the system that might contain artefacts related to the sus-
pect’s browsing activities. 
 
3.1.2 Examine Acquired Data 
Having surveyed the digital crime scene, DFAs will need to perform a detailed ex-
amination on the image of the system (working copy) acquired from the Acquisition 
and Collection Process. See the research paper presented in [7] for more details. 
During the Examination Phase, digital evidence needs to be made visible by extract-
ing data into a human-readable form [9, 10], [16]. DFAs should use the outcome of 
the Survey Digital Crime Scene Phase to direct their attention towards additional 
examination types.  As an example, they will need to conduct a keyword search 
once keywords are identified from other evidence. DFAs will also need to extract 
and process unallocated file system space for deleted files. Moreover, they should 
examine a low-level timeline of file activity to trace a user’s activity. 
 
Since there might be large volumes of data to be examined [16], [43], automated 
techniques should be employed using tools such as FTK [47] or EnCase [48] in 
order to support the investigators. Furthermore, a large number of techniques might 
be performed to process the obfuscated data such as deleted or hidden data utilising 
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sound digital forensic methods, as File Allocation tables or disk indexing might be 
deleted in some investigations. Therefore, this Phase will enable DFAs to ensure 
that files such as partially deleted files are recognized from the original evidence. 
During this Phase, DFAs can also reverse engineer suspicious executables and ex-
amine encrypted files [35]. They must also examine all the network packets that 
were acquired by monitoring software. In certain circumstances, it might be neces-
sary for DFAs to examine the contents of every cluster (physical search) or every 
file (logical search) [21]. They will also need to ensure that they employ different 
search techniques, when appropriate, when preforming this Phase. 
 
3.1.3 Harvest Data 
After all data including partially discovered files and folders has been made visible 
in the Examine Acquired Data Phase, data then needs to be harvested by giving a 
logical structure to the entire data set.  During this Phase, the file and folder structure 
is indexed to provide structure to data which was acquired in the Acquisition and 
Collection Process of the CDFIPM.  In this phase, raw data will be shown as infor-
mation, and the partially deleted files which were processed during the Examine 
Acquired Data Phase will become visible to the degree that they were rendered vis-
ible during the Examine Acquired Data Phase. The result of the Harvest Data Phase 
is the production of a logical structured data set [16] where the extracted raw data 
has now become structured information [49].  Therefore, the harvested information 
can now be displayed by the original file systems such as FAT or NTFS. 
 
3.1.4 Reduce Data 
The data examined and analysed in the course of a digital forensic investigation can 
be very large.  Consequently, this data needs to be reduced to expedite the Exami-
nation Process. Identifying known elements can enable the investigators to reduce 
data. Investigators will need to use the metadata and unique identifiers, such as 
MD5, in order to remove known system files and different other application data 
[21], [36], [49]. Data that remains will be modified data or data that could be 
uniquely attributed to the users of a specific computer system. Digital evidence with 
similar identifying patterns should also be classified based on the types of investi-
gation. 
 
3.1.5 Identify, Classify and Organise Digital Evidence 
During the Identify Digital Evidence Phase, DFAs must use the known digital evi-
dence data in order to identify the possible incident to be investigated. The outcome 
of this Phase will be the identification of the potential digital evidence from data 
that has been examined, harvested and reduced. In the Classify Digital Evidence 
Phase, DFAs should group together digital evidence with similar identifying pattern 
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based on the types of investigation. This phase will enable the speeding up of the 
Analysis Process discussed in the next section. During the Organise Digital Evi-
dence Phase, DFAs will need to organise digital evidence in a way so that digital 
forensic investigation can be accelerated. This can be materialized by focusing on 
the incident type identified and the data classified. DFAs should restructure digital 
evidence in order to conduct the identified investigation more appropriately. If sim-
ilar types of incidents or crimes have taken place in the past and are known to DFAs, 
they should then use the known classification in order to compare the current digital 
forensic data (representing potential digital evidence) to the similar past incidents 
or crimes.  At this stage, the Examination Process of the SDFIPM is completed, and 
its output becomes the input to the Analysis Process, discussed in the following 
section. 
 
3.2 Analysis Process 
Based upon the results of the Examination Process, DFAs must now be able to de-
fine what the exact characteristics of the incident are and who is to be held account-
able for the incident. The aim of the SDFIPM’s Analysis Process is to enable the 
investigators to reconstruct fragments of data based on their significance and to de-
termine a possible root cause of the incident [9, 10], [14]. The Analysis Process is 
the most time-consuming stage of the investigative process. Because of the volume, 
diversity and complexity of data to be analysed in present time digital investiga-
tions, the analysis of evidence becomes a challenge. Therefore, DFAs following the 
SDFIPM should use accredited automated techniques during this Process to com-
plement manual validation techniques in order to expedite this Process.  
 
Figure 3 represents the UML Activity Diagram of the SDFIPM’s Analysis Process 
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Figure 3. The UML Activity Diagram of the Analysis Process 
 
3.2.1 Develop a Hypothesis 
Up to this point in the investigation, DFAs have only dealt with what is possibly 
known from the digital evidence (Montasari et al., 2015).  Now, DFAs must be able 
to formulate a hypothesis of how the incident took place by reconstructing a se-
quence of events which have resulted in the current state of the system under inves-
tigation.  In order to develop a hypothesis for the incident or crime, DFAs should 
base their theory on the followings:  
 
 The assumptions that they have deduced from the phases contained in the 
Examination Process;  
 Digital evidence that they have already organised from the Organise Digi-
tal Evidence Phase contained in the Examination Process; and 
 The documentation of the crime scene that they have maintained. 
 
3.2.2 Analyse Digital Evidence 
After DFAs have formulated the hypothesis, they will need to perform the Analyse 
Digital Evidence Phase. During this Phase, DFAs must thoroughly investigate and 
test data that was organised in the Examination Process against the hypothesis that 
was formulated in the Develop a Hypothesis Phase in the Analysis Process. DFIs 
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issues such as relevance, admissibility and weight as discussed in [2], [9]. This will 
enable them to test the hypothesis by identifying the best possible evidence.    
 
3.2.3 Attribute 
Digital evidence should then be linked and attributed to a specific user or the event 
which is the root cause of the incident or crime. In order to link an individual to the 
incident or crime, DFAs must be able to correlate the results of the digital crime 
scene with physical evidence. For instance, in some investigations, DFAs are likely 
to need to correlate data center access logs to logins, linking online chat activities 
found on the computer with the activity with an undercover officer, and correlating 
activity on a compromised server with activity on the suspect's home system and 
network activity recorded by an ISP. 
 
3.2.4 Evaluate Analysis Results 
After the attribution has been made, during the Evaluate Analysis Results Phase, 
the DFAs must then evaluate their findings in order to ensure that the hypothesis 
they have developed holds true. Finally, in order for the Analysis Process to be most 
effective, DFAs might need to request other digital crime experts to assist them in 
correlating the event from numerous sources of digital evidence.  At this stage of 
the Investigative Process, backtracking from the Analysis Process to the Examina-
tion Process is often to be expected as the investigators acquire a better understand-
ing of the events which resulted in the investigation in the first place. Having com-
pleted all the Phases of the Analysis Process, this Process is now complete, and 
DFAs must start preparing for the interpretation of the analysis in the next process. 
The output of the Analysis Process will become the input to the Interpretation Pro-
cess discussed in the next section. 
 
3.3 Interpretation Process 
The main purpose of the Interpretation Process is to use scientifically proven meth-
ods to explain facts discovered throughout the Analysis Process within the context 
of the investigation [9, 10], [50]. Therefore, after investigators have evaluated their 
findings in the Analysis Process and have determined that the hypothesis they for-
mulated holds true, they will need to interpret the digital evidence in order to pro-
duce meaningful statements in the legal context for later reporting and presentation. 
During this Process, DFAs must be able to reconstruct the events associated with 
the digital investigation aspect. They should now be able to employ the results of 
the analysis techniques that they performed during the Analysis Process to put to-
gether the pieces of digital puzzle so that an accurate reconstruction of events can 
be made.  
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Figure 4 represents the UML Activity Diagram of the SDFIPM’s Interpretation Pro-
cess followed by the description of its lower-level components, i.e. Phases and Sub-
Phases. 
 
Figure 4. The UML Activity Diagram of the Interpretation Process 
 
3.3.1 Interpret Analysis Results 
Interpretation of any evidence should depend on the available information regarding 
the circumstances surrounding the creation of that item of digital evidence [15], 
[51]. Investigators will need to obtain information from individuals involved in the 
day-to-day operation of the system under investigation. This will enable them to 
carry out a more effective interpretation of evidence. Moreover, investigators must 
consider information concerning the goal as well as the scope of the investigation. 
In cases where the contextual information changes, investigators might also need to 
change the interpretation so that the interpretation can reflect any such changes re-
garding the contextual information. Finally, during this process, DFAs must utilise 
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3.3.2 Classify and Organise the Interpreted Evidence 
Having interpreted the analysis results, investigators will now need to classify and 
evaluate the interpreted evidence in order to ascertain the amount of trust that they 
can place in it. DFIs will also need to organise the interpreted digital evidence ac-
cording to relevance in such a way that they can differentiate which digital evidence 
items are more important than the others. DFIs following the SDFIPM should per-
form the Classify the Interpreted Evidence Phase and Organise the Interpreted Evi-
dence in the Interpretation Process in parallel. This is due the fact that although both 
phases have different activities, they have the same aim. Finally, during the Analy-
sis Process, DFAs will need to employ scientific methods in order to prove or refute 
theories based on digital evidence. After performing this process, DFAs should be 
able to determine how digital evidence came into existence and what its presence 
denotes.  After completing the Interpretation Process, DFIs will need to reconstruct 
the events in the next process of the SDFIPM. Therefore, the output of the Interpre-
tation Process will become the input to the Event Reconstruction Process discussed 
in the next section. 
 
3.4 Event Reconstruction Process 
In the SDFIPM, the Event Reconstruction Process and Interpretation Process are 
closely related in that both Processes will require DFAs to reconstruct the events 
associated with the digital investigation.  Similar to the Interpretation Process, the 
Event Reconstruction Process requires DFAs to employ scientific methods in order 
to prove or refute theories based on the results of the analysis, and digital evidence 
that they have discovered. The only difference between the two Processes is that in 
the Event Reconstruction Process, DFIs will need to consolidate, review and test 
their findings against the original hypothesis that they formulated in the Analysis 
Process. 
 
Having completed the Interpretation Process in the previous stage, DFAs should 
now be able to reconstruct a possible event sequence under the Event Reconstruc-
tion Process which reflects the incident result as accurately as possible.  In order to 
reconstruct the events, DFIs will need to utilise the series of events that they have 
deduced from digital evidence which is known to them. During this Process, DFAs 
must ensure that they are not dealing with reconstruction as a finding based on the 
original digital evidence [16]. Moreover, as Kent et al. [52] state, Event Reconstruc-
tion should not be established as factual. Instead, DFAs who perform the Event 
Reconstruction Process should use this Process to explain how the incident might 
have taken place.  
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Figure 5 represents the UML Activity Diagram of the SDFIPM’s Event Reconstruc-
tion Process followed by the description of its lower-level components, i.e. Phases 
and Sub-Phases. 
Figure 5. The UML Activity Diagram of the Event Reconstruction Process 
 
3.4.1 Event Reconstruction Components 
During the Event Reconstruction Process, the investigation findings must be con-
solidated and refined prior to assessing the review results against the original hy-
pothesis, which was formulated in the Analysis Process.  This will be to determine 
whether DFAs have acquired all the evidence required to support the original hy-
pothesis. If all the evidence has not been captured, DFAs will need to backtrack to 
the Survey Digital Crime Scene Phase in the Examination Process, in which this 
Phase and subsequent Phases form a cycle that needs to be repeated until DFAs can 
identify additional evidence and explain the incident.   
 
As an example, in cases where a server intrusion has taken place, this iteration 
would involve DFIs linking the exploitation of a service that is open to attack with 
the installation of a rootkit and utilization of a network sniffer. The source IP ad-
dress of network connections could result in the acquisition of additional digital 
evidence to examine. If there is no need to iterate to the Examination Process at this 
stage, DFAs must identify any areas of improvement and address those required 
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improvements. In order to press charges against the perpetrator and explain the in-
cident in a court, DFAs must have a valid hypothesis accompanied by relevant ad-
missible digital evidence to support the findings that they have deduced. Finally, 
during the Event Reconstruction Process, DFAs might benefit from using link anal-
ysis and timeline tools to assist them in the digital reconstruction. The Event Re-
construction Process of the SDFIPM is completed at this stage and DFAs should 
prepare for the next Process where they will need to compile a report to be presented 
in a court or the management in a company. The output of the Event Reconstruction 
Process will become the input to the Reporting Process, discussed in the next sec-
tion. 
 
3.5 Reporting Process 
After conducting the Event Reconstruction Process, DFAs will need to compile, 
write and print out on paper a detailed and concise report in the Reporting Process.  
Regardless of digital evidence or physical evidence, a forensic report must contain 
conclusions that can be reproduced by independent third parties. Forensic reports 
that include opinions based on accurately documented digital sources are much 
more likely to withstand judicial scrutiny than opinions based on less reliable 
sources [53]. DFAs following the SDFIPM must detail in their report all the findings 
and results of the entire digital investigative process including the Concurrent Pro-
cesses (Overriding Principles) of the SDFIPM such as documentation, chain of cus-
tody, digital evidence preservation, authorisation and management, and ultimately 
the investigators’ findings that are constructed in an opinion to be presented in a 
court. In addition, the forensic report should follow “the ‘ABC’s of writing’ (accu-
racy, brevity, and clarity)” and be restricted only to what is known [36]. DFAs will 
need to write their report in such a manner that it contains conclusions that can be 
reproduced by independent third parties regardless of digital or physical evidence. 
Also, since digital forensic investigation might produce many incriminating digital 
evidence items, DFAs must therefore ensure that they list all digital evidence items 
in the report so that no valuable item of evidence is left out. Furthermore, DFAs 
must ensure that they include in the report all other relevant documentation that was 
compiled during the investigation and that might be relevant in reaching a decision.  
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Figure 6. The UML Activity Diagram of the Reporting Process 
 
DFAs should also ensure that they reference accepted and known protocols and 
methods applied during the Examination, Analysis, Interpretation and Event Recon-
struction Processes in order to increase the credibility of the investigation and its 
results.  Finally, DFAs employing the SDFIPM must ensure that their report is in a 
simple language and is well-defined, concise and unambiguous in order for the lay 
person to be able to understand it. After DFIs have compiled the report and are 
satisfied with its content, the report will then need to be presented in a court. The 
output of the Reporting Process becomes the input to the Presentation Process of 
the SDFIPM, discussed in the next section. 
 
3.6 Presentation Process 
The output of the Reporting Process in the form of a well-written report must be 
presented to a wide variety of audiences such as courts, legal personnel, law en-
forcement, technical personnel and management. Presenting the report can be car-
ried out in the form of the expert report or can be accompanied by other formats 
such as multimedia presentation, deposition and expert witness (testimony). During 
the Presentation Process, DFAs will need to be able to prove the hypothesis that 
they formulated during the Analysis Process using supporting evidence. In order to 
prove that all of the SDFIPM’s previous Processes were conducted accurately, evi-
dence that DFAs present must hold up in a court.  
 
Although Presentation Process is very important in that it meets the main require-
ment needed by the definition of the word ‘forensic’, authors of the existing models 
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cursory approach when dealing with the Presentation Process and have often con-
fused this Process with the Reporting Process.  In the existing models, Presentation 
Process and Reporting Process are regarded the same, and as a result they are as-
signed one single process under the naming either “Report” or “Presentation”. This 
approach is flawed on the basis that the Reporting Process and Presentation Process 
are carried out at different times and under different circumstances during the course 
of an investigative process and as a result have different aims. The purpose of the 
Reporting Process should be to document relevant information deduced from the 
findings and results of the investigative process, whereas the aim of the Presentation 
Process should be to communicate such information and findings to the said audi-
ence. Therefore, in the SDFIPM, the Presentation Process has been distinguished 
from the Reporting Process, and as a result each has been assigned a separate and 
discrete Process in the model. Moreover, the “Report/Presentation” in the existing 
models is often a high-level Process without providing adequate details to assist 
DFAs in effectively preparing for this important Process. Since careful planning is 
essential especially when the investigation findings are to be presented in a court, 
the Presentation Process of the SDFIPM has incorporated lower-level and generic 
phases to guide the DFIs on how to prepare for this Process.   
 
During the Presentation Process, DFAs must communicate their findings in such a 
way that facilitates future validation and that can be understood by both technical 
and non-technical audience. Mumba and Venter [54] state that during the Presenta-
tion Process, it is vital that all of the processes are utilised to prove that the investi-
gation was conducted in a forensically sound manner. Beebe and Clark [36] high-
light that a presentation should be based on “careful consideration about how to best 
communicate information to various audiences”. Therefore, during the Presentation 
Process, DFAs following the SDFIPM must provide both concise and detailed con-
firmatory information obtained from the Interpretation and Event Reconstruction 
Processes of the model concerning the data examined and analysed in the Exami-
nation and Analysis Processes of the model. The presentation must also include 
relevant documentation and processes conducted during the investigative process, 
as well as any relevant physical evidence that can further consolidate the case 
against the perpetrator.   
 
Figure 7 represents the UML Activity Diagram of the SDFIPM’s Presentation Pro-
cess followed by the description of its lower-level components, i.e. Phases and Sub-
Phases. 
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Figure 7. The UML Activity Diagram of the Presentation Process 
 
 
3.6.1 Components of the Presentation Process 
Prior to delivering the presentation, DFAs must address the following four issues:  
 
 choosing their main points carefully based on the results of the CDFIPM’s 
Interpretation and Event Reconstruction Processes;  
 selecting their supporting information; 
 developing a conclusion; and 
 reviewing their presentation prior to its delivery.   
 
Since the judge and jury or other interested parties are very likely to be non-tech-
nical users, DFAs must ensure that in their presentation they avoid complex argu-
ments, unless providing the audience with significant help so that they understand 
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the technical points made. DFAs must deliver their conclusion in a logical and struc-
tured manner and build upon their previous points. In addition to preparing the 
presentation itself, DFAs will also need to prepare supporting information in order 
to assist the audience in better understanding the points they make. This should in-
clude the factual data itself that they have deduced from Interpretation and Event 
Reconstruction Processes and also the explanation of the process. DFAs might also 
need to use diagrams, pictures and video if it enables the audience to understand the 
explained concepts more clearly. Another important stage in the Presentation Pro-
cess is the conclusion that DFAs have arrived at. They must ensure that they remind 
the audience of their main points and leave the audience with a clear understanding 
of them and their judgments on the case.   
 
After preparing the presentation and prior to appearing before the relevant audience, 
DFAs will need to review their presentation to ensure that its content meets the 
objectives of the report, is logically structured and contains the material at the right 
level for the audience. In cases where DFAs will have to appear before judge and 
jury to give expert witness, they must ensure that they are fully aware of the juris-
diction legal requirements (the U.K. in the context of this research) concerning the 
digital evidence.  Not being aware of the legal requirements might render the in-
criminating evidence being thrown out of the court. Moreover, DFAs must find out 
in advance what legal proceedings will concern the appeal process so that they can 
be better prepared in case they might need to reappear before the court.  Often the 
person who presents the findings of the case is not often involved in various stages 
of the investigative process such as Acquisition, Examination, Analysis, Interpreta-
tion and Event Reconstruction Processes. Therefore, DFA who is required to appear 
before a court as an expert witness must determine who his target audience are prior 
to preparing the presentation if this is not already known.   
 
Investigators also need to ensure that they identify the exhibits (i.e. digital evidence) 
by a label or other mark. The exhibit must also be properly described in the report 
as discussed in the Reporting Process section.  When delivering the presentation, 
DFAs must take into account that the target audience are often non-technical and 
might have a variety of experiences and level of knowledge concerning the digital 
investigations. Therefore, in order to help the audience to understand the explained 
concepts better while giving the presentation, DFA might need to link their investi-
gation findings to the things that the audience already understand. DFAs need to 
ensure that they have targeted their findings at the right level for the needs of the 
audience. They must also avoid using technical jargon and should attempt to explain 
the abstract concepts with clear practical examples.   
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During the presentation, often the hypothesis is challenged by the defence lawyers. 
A contradicting hypothesis and supporting evidence are placed before judge and 
jury. DFAs will need to prove the credibility of their hypothesis and to be well-
prepared to defend the hypothesis against criticism and challenge.  In circumstances 
in which challenges are successful, investigators will need to backtrack to the earlier 
stages to obtain and examine more evidence and develop a better hypothesis.  The 
case will be decided based on the presentation report. If the decision is made in a 
court, it will be decided whether to convict the accused or whether to refute the 
allegations. If the decision is made in the context of an organisation, it will be de-
cided what disciplinary actions must be taken if the incident can be attributed to the 
individual under investigation. At this stage, the Presentation Process of the 
CDFIPM is concluded, and its output becomes the input to the Investigation Closure 
Process, discussed in the following section. 
 
3.7 Investigation Closure Process 
It is vital not only to close the investigation and apply the decisions associated with 
it but also to maintain the knowledge obtained to improve subsequent investigations 
[36]. As the title suggests, the Investigation Closure Process of the SDFIPM in-
volves concluding the investigation and also the decision-making on the credibility 
of the hypothesis presented in the Presentation Process. This denotes that after com-
pleting the Investigation Closure Process, investigators can backtrack to any of the 
preceding processes that follow the First Response Process.  
 
Figure 8 represents the UML Activity Diagram of the SDFIPM’s Investigation Clo-




Figure 8. The UML Activity Diagram of the Investigation Closure Process 
 
3.7.1 Review the Outcome of the Case 
After the case has been presented to the appropriate audience and decided in the 
Presentation Process, the outcome of the investigation will need to be used to review 
the existing policies and procedures of the organisation. The aim of this Phase 
should be to make and act upon the outcome of the decisions reached from the 
CDFIPM’s Presentation Process. During this Phase, the investigating organisation 
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will also need to collect and maintain all the information associated with the case 
that has been investigated. 
 
3.7.2 Accept or Reject the Hypothesis 
Since the CDFIPM is an iterative process model, it will allow investigators to back-
track to any of the preceding Processes in the model.   Having carried out the initial 
review, at this stage the investigators can return to any of the CDFIPM’s previous 
Processes that follow the First Response Process if required. 
 
3.7.3 Conduct a Critical Review 
During the Conduct a Critical Review Phase, the entire investigative process de-
tailed in the SDFIPM must be reviewed to identify any lessons learnt and potential 
areas of improvement. During this Phase, the investigating organisation will also 
need to address issues such as what went well, what did not go well and how things 
could have been carried out better, etc. Based on this information, the investigating 
organisation will need to identify and learn the lessons from the incident or crime 
in order to be able to apply the findings and be better prepared for the future inci-
dents or crimes. Also under this phase, the outcomes and their ensuing interpretation 
must be used for refining the Acquisition, Examination, Analysis, Interpretation and 
Event Reconstruction of digital evidence in future investigations. As already stated, 
often backtracking between Examination, Analysis, Interpretation and Event Re-
construction Processes are to be expected in order to obtain the full picture of the 
incident or crime. Such information could also assist law enforcements’ HTCUs 
and corporates in establishing more effective policies and procedures. 
 
3.7.4 Evidence Management 
A decision will also need to be made to determine whether digital and physical ev-
idence should be returned to the proper owner or not and to determine what criminal 
evidence must be removed. This is a complicated issue and not an explicit step in a 
digital forensic investigation. However, any of the existing models that has empha-
sized the seizure of evidence has seldom addressed this aspect.  Jurisdiction in 
which the investigation is taking place (in the context of this thesis, the U.K.) and 
the type of authorisation determine whether the evidence should be returned, 
cleansed and reused or destroyed or whether the evidence should be stored for a 
certain period of time before any of the three possibilities can be applied. 
 
3.7.5 Record the Case Decision 
Under the Record the Case Decision Phase, DFIs will need to record (ideally on a 
database) the investigation results, case decision as well as all the evidence that 
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might be used for reference in the future and for training purposes.  For instance, 
the results could be recorded by the category of evidence found as follows: 
 
 Evidence of refutation or defence, 
 Evidence vital to the case, 
 Evidence important to the case, 
 Evidence that supports other evidence, 
 Evidence peripheral to the case, 
 Evidence that is intelligence only, and 
 No evidence found. 
 
Such an approach could also benefit authorities in other jurisdictions in circum-
stances in which the case will be likely to have some kind of connection with their 
investigation.    
 
3.7.6 Disseminate the Investigation Results 
In the final part of the Investigation Closure Process, relevant information concern-
ing the entire investigation will need to be disseminated and communicated to all 
stakeholders. This includes communicating the need to return to a previous Process, 
deciding on the acceptance or rejection of the hypothesis or providing any reports 
or documents from the Presentation Process. During this Phase, the investigating 
organisation might decide to make some information available only within the or-
ganisation, whereas they might decide to disseminate other information more 
widely. According to [43], the investigating organisation’s policies and procedures 
should determine the details in this regard.  The information will have an impact on 
future investigations and might have an effect on the policies and procedures.   
 
Thus, the accumulation and preservation of this information is a key part of sup-
porting the work of investigators and might be a productive aspect for the develop-
ment of innovative applications that integrate techniques such as data mining and 
expert systems. Hauck et al. [55] provide a detailed example of the dissemination 
activity where they define a system titled Coplink, that provides real-time support 
for law enforcement DFIs through an analysis application on the basis of a large 
accumulation of information from past investigations. An additional example is pro-
vided by Harrison et al. [56], whose system is not real-time, but instead delivers an 
“archival function” database to support investigators. At this stage, the Investigation 
Closure Process of the SDFIPM is concluded, and its output becomes the input to 
the Future Readiness Process Class, discussed in the following section.  
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3.8 Overriding Principles 
In order to ensure the admissibility of digital evidence in courts, a set of eight Over-
riding Principles or Concurrent Processes have also been developed and grouped 
into a unique class, entitled Concurrent Processes Class (see Figure 1). These eight 
Principles are objectives that need to be achieved in a given digital investigation 
and should be performed concurrently throughout the whole or parts of the other 
Processes in the SDFIPM. The inclusion of the proposed Overriding Principles or 
Concurrent Processes is justified by their significance and applicability to other dig-
ital investigation processes. Thus, due to their extreme importance, investigators 
must maintain these Principles at all times throughout the whole or parts of the dig-
ital investigative process. Since the SDFIPM is aimed at the U.K. jurisdiction, the 
proposed Overriding Principles are based on the following standards and guidelines: 
[51], [57, 58], as well as other relevant scientific papers such as [10], [14, 15], [21], 
[35, 36], [43]. 
 
3.8.1 Preserve Digital and Physical Evidence 
Preservation is the process to maintain and safeguard the integrity and original con-
dition of both physical and digital evidence. In order for evidence to be able to with-
stand scrutiny in courts, investigating organisations will need to prove that both 
digital device and digital evidence that they have handled during an investigation 
have not been altered, or justify their actions if unavoidable changes were made. In 
the best-case scenario, there should be no contamination to data itself or any 
metadata associated with it (e.g. date and time-stamps).   
 
In some cases, the confidentiality of digital evidence is a requirement, either a busi-
ness requirement or a legal requirement. This denotes that digital evidence should 
be preserved in a manner that ensures the confidentiality of data. Thus, since the 
correct handling of evidence is essential in any digital investigation [7], [9, 10], 
[15], [57, 58, 59], this Overriding Principle or Action Principle has been incorpo-
rated into the CDFIPM to enable investigating organisations to preserve the integ-
rity of both digital and physical evidence throughout the entire investigative process 
in a forensically sound manner. Preserving this Overriding Principle will enable 
investigating organisations to protect both physical and digital evidence from being 
tampered with, contaminated or altered and as a result to ensure the efficacy of ev-
idence presented to a court.  
 
Almost all the existing models have undertaken a flawed approach towards the issue 
of preservation and have provided a superficial discussion of this aspect of digital 
investigative process by simply stating that digital evidence needs to be preserved 
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without elaborating on this important aspect.  Moreover, preservation in some ex-
isting DFIPMs refer only to preservation of physical evidence or crime scene [21], 
[35] while in some other models it refers to preservation of only digital evidence 
[16], [35], [39], or digital evidence during the transportation or storage [15], [39], 
[43].   
 
Although some existing models [21], [35] have discussed preservation in more 
depth, their approach of dealing with this principle is still flawed as the “preserva-
tion activity” in these models is restricted to a ‘single Phase’ at a particular stage of 
the investigative process. It is, however, argued that preservation has a much wider 
scope beyond being limited to a single point in time. Each stage of investigative 
process requires digital and physical evidence to be preserved in a different manner. 
In order to address the stated issues, in the SDFIPM, preservation has been intro-
duced as an Overriding Principle or Actionable Principle that should be applied 
concurrently throughout the entire investigative processes of the model from the 
time the incident is detected in the Incident Detection Process up to and including 
the time when the investigation is formally completed in the Investigation Closure 
Process. Preservation does not need to be applied during the Readiness and Future 
Readiness Processes on the basis that evidence (both physical and digital) is not 
handled during these two Processes. The remainder of this section provides some 
practical examples of how the investigating organisations should apply the preser-
vation aspect of the investigative process throughout the entire stages of the 
SDFIPM.  
 
During the SDFIPM’s Secure and Evaluate the Crime Scene Process, the preserva-
tion might involve investigators preventing unauthorised people from entering or 
leaving the crime scene, isolating the system from the network, acquiring the vola-
tile data that would be lost after the system is powered down, and detecting suspi-
cious processes that are running on the system, etc. During the Acquisition and Col-
lection Process, preservation involves DFIs securing log files in case that they are 
lost before the system is imaged. Preservation also requires DFIs to make a full 
forensic image backup of the system so that it can be examined and analysed at a 
later stage in a DFL. DFIs must note that a full forensic image of the system pre-
serves the whole digital crime scene whereas copies that are system backups pre-
serve only the allocated data within the digital crime scene. Moreover, in terms of 
preserving the state of the network, this can be achieved by network monitors when 
they save network traffic.  
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Finally, as part of preservation, investigating organisations will also need to estab-
lish and maintain certain strict procedures [15], effective quality systems such as 
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) [26] or procedural workflows [60]. 
 
3.8.2 Preserve Chain of Custody 
The processes for documenting, collecting and protecting both physical and digital 
evidence are called the establishing of the chain of custody. Establishing a chain of 
custody during the course of an investigation is of extreme importance since digital 
evidence is very likely to be handled by various parties. Cases where Chain of Cus-
tody has not been properly preserved have been easily challenged in courts and re-
jected irrespective of evidence discovered from the suspect’s computer system.  
Therefore, due to its extreme importance in relation to conducting a successful in-
vestigation, Chain of Custody has been incorporated into the SDFIPM as an Over-
riding Principle, namely Preserve Chain of Custody, that will need to be applied 
concurrently throughout other Processes of the SDFIPM. In order to preserve Chain 
of Custody, DFIs will need to adhere to all legal requirements and must document 
each given process of the SDFIPM thoroughly. Documentation (discussed later) is 
a vital aspect of a Chain of Custody as it will need to detail the activities associated 
with the chronology of the movement and handling of evidence such as those asso-
ciated with the seizure, custody, control, transfer, examination, analysis and dispo-
sition of both physical and digital evidence.  
 
The issue of establishing Chain of Custody has been ignored by almost all the ex-
isting models, a problem identified also by the authors in [16], [43] and [35]. Alt-
hough Chain of Custody has been addressed to some extent by four guidelines and 
standards including: [51], [57, 58], [61], these appear to be contradictory in terms 
of the point at which Chain of Custody will need to be established during an inves-
tigative process. For example, according to [57, 58], Chain of Custody should be 
initiated from the Acquisition Process onwards, whereas [51] and [61] state that 
Chain of Custody must be maintained throughout the entire investigative process. 
 
The approach taken by [57, 58] appears to be flawed on the basis that digital device 
containing potential digital evidence is identified in the incident detection stage 
prior to the Acquisition Process. It is in the Incident Detection stage that the inves-
tigating organisations will need to process both physical (where items of evidentiary 
value exist) and digital crime scenes and therefore initiate the chain of custody. 
Consequently, in line with [51] and [61], DFIs following the SDFIPM must observe 
this Overriding Principle from the Incident Detection Process, during which inci-
dent is detected, up to and including the Investigation Closure Process, where inci-
dent is formally closed. One of the benefits of such an approach taken by author’s 
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is that it will enable DFIs to trace back the history of any digital device containing 
evidence to the time that it was first identified until its present status and location. 
Another benefit of this approach is the enabling of the identification of access and 
movement of potential digital evidence at any given point in time.  
 
In any type of investigation, investigators within the investigating organisations are 
often accountable for all the acquired evidence (both physical and digital) during 
the period in which evidence is within their custody. The SDFIPM’s Preserve Chain 
of Custody Principle also requires DFIs to keep records of who was responsible for 
handling both physical and digital evidence. Investigators must keep a record of all 
information associated with different activities undertaken in relation to Chain of 
Custody. The Chain of Custody record itself may comprise more than one document 
and include a series of related documents. For instance, for potential digital evi-
dence, there should be a contemporaneous document recording the acquisition of 
digital data to a particular device, the movement of that device and documentation 
recording subsequent extracts or copies of potential digital evidence for analysis or 
other purposes.   
 
An example of preserving Chain of Custody is when evidence copies are required 
to be shared with other experts in other locations. This handling of evidence must 
be properly documented to preserve Chain of Custody. Another example of Chain 
of Custody is when the first responders (who are the first custodian to preserve 
Chain of Custody of potential digital evidence) arrive at the crime scene where they 
will need to describe the scene in the preliminary drafting of documentation. These 
include taking photographs, videos and sketches.  
   
The SDFIPM’s Preserve Chain of Custody Principle does not impose any particular 
format in which information related to Chain of Custody should be recorded. The 
documents detailing Chain of Custody can be in the form of digital data or other 
formats such as paper notes, depending on the organisation or the agency conduct-
ing the investigation. The SDFIPM’s flexibility allows investigating organisations 
to design and incorporate into the model their own Chain of Custody forms accord-
ing to their needs.  
 
3.8.3 Manage Information Flow 
One of the major issues with the existing models is the lack of identifying ‘Infor-
mation Flow’ which could have a negative impact on the other processes such as 
Chain of Custody. In this regard, Ciardhuáin [43] criticizes the past models stating, 
“The single largest gap in the existing models is that they do not explicitly identify 
the information flows in investigations.” Ciardhuáin [43] proceeds to propose what 
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would become one of the most widely referenced research papers in relation to In-
formation Flow within a digital investigation. In his research paper, Ciardhuáin [43] 
is able to define, identify and describe Information Flows within his process model 
so that its stages can be protected and supported technologically. Moreover, he 
clearly shows Information Flow that must exist amongst various stakeholders.    
 
Due to the fact that the subject of Information Flow within the field of digital foren-
sics has been extensively covered by the aforementioned reference, this paper does 
not aim to focus on Information Flow in any further details. However, due to its 
importance in a digital investigation, Information Flow has been incorporated into 
the SDFIPM as an Overriding Principle, namely Manage Information Flow, which 
needs to be managed concurrently throughout the entire processes of the SDFIPM. 
The rationale for including this principle in the SDFIPM is to enable investigating 
organisations to deal with the different laws, practices, languages, etc. correctly in 
digital investigations. An example of Information Flow could be the interaction be-
tween two investigators involved in the same investigation, or the exchange of dig-
ital evidence between various parties during digital investigation process. Infor-
mation Flow can be protected, for instance, by utilising trusted public key 
infrastructure (PKI) and time stamping to identify the different investigators and 
authenticate evidence in addition to protecting the confidentiality of the evidence 
through PKI-based encryption. 
 
3.8.4 Maintain a Detailed Case Management 
As the title suggests, Case Management refers to managing the case under investi-
gation and keeping track of evidence items, events and vital forensic discoveries. 
Case Management mainly pertains to the tasks that a case officer should undertake 
throughout the entire investigative process in an investigation, and also to some 
extent relates to the responsibilities of the case officer’s investigative team mem-
bers.  Activities associated with the Case Management can have significant impact 
on the entire investigative process tying together all of the activities and their out-
comes. Casey [21] highlights the importance of the Case Management stating, “Ef-
fective case management is one of the most important components of scaffolding, 
helping digital investigators bind everything together into a strong case.” Similarly, 
Khatir et al. [62] proclaim that the effectiveness of a digital investigation is reliant 
upon Case Management.   
 
The lack of effective Case Management methods will result in investigative oppor-
tunities being easily neglected, digital evidence being disregarded or lost, and in-
criminating information representing potential digital evidence remaining undis-
covered or not being passed onto decision makers.  Therefore, due to its importance 
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in a digital investigation, Case Management has been incorporated into the SDFIPM 
as an Overriding Principle, namely Maintain a Detailed Case Management, that will 
need to be applied from the Readiness Process up to and including Investigation 
Closure Process. The rationale for including this principle into the SDFIPM is as 
follow: 
 
to outline the responsibilities and certain important tasks that both a case 
officer and his investigative team members will need to undertake in order 
to ensure a successful investigation [62],  
to enable a smooth transition between different Processes of the model, and 
also to ensure that all applicable information that results from each Process 
is acquired, documented and intertwined together in order to reconstruct the 
events associated with the crime or incident in a vivid and compelling man-
ner.  
 
The remainder of this section provides some examples of the tasks and types of 
responsibilities that a case officer and his investigative team members are to under-
take under this Overriding Principle, Maintain a Detailed Case Management.  
 
The tasks of a case officer start after the incident has been reported in the Incident 
Detection Process (the discussion of which is outside the scope of this paper), where 
he needs to decide whether to accept or reject the case and determine the time and 
budget required to carry out the investigation. The case officer will subsequently 
need to develop an accurate and detailed plan that investigators can follow; this plan 
must define clearly the milestones, goals and sub-goals within the investigative pro-
cess [62]. The case officer must also allocate tasks to individual team members, 
oversee these tasks as well as drawing a complete picture of the entire investigative 
process and its outcomes so that the investigation does not deviate from its correct 
course. In circumstances where the investigation has deviated from its correct 
course, the manager will need to identify the root cause of the deviation and guide 
the team members into the correct path. Case officers will also be responsible for 
obtaining written authorisation so that the investigation can proceed as well as de-
termining what level of attention to give to a particular case comparative to all of 
the other cases that they are dealing with [62].   
 
As already stated, in addition to the case officers, the Maintain a Detailed Case 
Management Principle also pertains to the investigative team members who will 
need to undertake various tasks under this Overriding Principle. These include com-
munication and prioritization such as sharing information amongst DFIs, meeting 
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the requirements of non-technical stakeholders, prioritizing and assigning adminis-
trative tasks amongst multiple DFIs in a digital investigation, etc. In certain inves-
tigations, communication becomes a key aspect of case management [62]. For ex-
ample, in complex investigations that might last for long time, daily or weekly status 
meetings are required in order to discuss and analyse progress, combine up-to-date 
information and discuss and review the following steps in the investigation. Finally, 
logging digital evidence in archives is another important factor in managing an in-
vestigation effectively. This task can be carried out by both the case officer or the 
investigative team members [62].   
 
3.8.5 Prepare and Test Tools and Techniques 
It is vital that DFIs prepare an appropriate set of tools and techniques during the 
course of an investigation so that each process of the investigative process can be 
carried out effectively. DFIs might require different sets of tools and techniques to 
be able to carry out each given process in the investigative process. Therefore, this 
aspect of the digital investigative process has been incorporated into the SDFIPM 
as an Overriding Principle, namely Prepare and Test Tools and Techniques, that 
will need to be followed throughout all the other Processes of the model. This Prin-
ciple has been extensively covered in technical standard documents such as [63, 
64], guidelines such as National Institute of Standards and Technology [52] and 
[65], as well as technical reports such as Information Assurance Advisory Council 
(IAAC) [66].   
 
For instance, under a comprehensive project, entitled CFTT (Computer Forensics 
Tools Testing), carried out by the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
[65], various methodologies have been established for testing computer forensic 
software tools through the development of general tool specifications, test proce-
dures, test criteria, test sets, and test hardware. This detailed guideline provides nec-
essary information for digital forensic tools developers to improve their tools, and 
also enable DFIs to make informed choices about obtaining and testing digital fo-
rensic tools and understand the tools’ capabilities.   
 
Therefore, due to the fact that tools and techniques testing and preparation have 
already been covered in detail, this paper does not aim to focus on this aspect of the 
investigative process in more details.  However, some examples on certain steps 
that DFIs will need to undertake in relation to this Overriding Principle will still be 
provided only for illustrative purposes. Some activities that DFIs will need to per-
form in relation to Prepare and Test Tools and Techniques Principle include, but are 
not limited to: 
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determining which tools must be used for each given Process of the 
CDFIPM, 
identifying which tools must be utilised for different data analysis tasks, 
investigating and establishing which tools have been scientifically tested, 
and 
identifying the degree of error in connection with tools.  
 
Cases where untested tools have been used to carry out digital investigations are 
easily challenged in courts. Therefore, one key element that DFIs will need to con-
sider at all times under this Principle is the need to select tools that are court-proven 
such as EnCase, AccessData FTK, ProDiscover, Sleuthkit and Autopsy. Another 
important aspect that investigators will need to adhere to under this Overriding Prin-
ciple is the need to have up-to-date training on how to use the latest versions of 
different forensic tools in order to make effective use of them. 
 
Finally, as already stated, each Process within an investigative process might require 
different sets of tools. For example, to conduct the Examination Process, the soft-
ware tools such as FTK and EnCase, that are capable of revealing hidden, deleted, 
swapped and corrupted files or performing data carving, will need to be utilised. In 
terms of techniques, for example in cases where public and private IP addresses 
need to be acquired and mapped to the country and institutions, IP addresses can be 
readily acquired by performing the following commands: ping, nslookup, dig, trac-
ert from a DNS server.  Moreover, DFIs can easily locate a county by various online 
tools such as IP Location [67] or WhatIsMyIPAddress [68]. 
 
3.8.6 Obtain and Adhere to Authorisation 
Any digital investigation that is commissioned to be carried out necessitates proper 
authorisation, whether it is an internal or an external authorisation. In fact, each 
single stage of digital investigation should be authorised, and therefore an authori-
sation is required for each given process. Due to its significance on the investigative 
process, authorisation has been incorporated into the SDFIPM as an Overriding 
Principle, namely Obtain and Adhere to Authorisation. This Overriding Principle 
requires investigating organisations to obtain proper authorisation from one of the 
following groups: government authorities, system owners, system custodians, prin-
ciples or users etc., when undertaking a digital investigation. The significance of 
this Principle for activities carried out during the digital investigation processes is 
justified by the fact that the rights of the system owners, custodians, principles or 
users should not be infringed.  Moreover, this principle ensures that no law is vio-
lated. The environment in which digital investigation is carried out determines the 
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type of authorisation required. The authorisation might be needed both within a le-
gal environment or an organisational environment. Authorisation for investigations 
involving law enforcement often requires a search warrant or other legal approval 
that requires sufficient evidence or suspicion. For corporate incidents, search war-
rants are not usually required so long as the proper privacy policies are in place. 
This Overriding Principle must be adhered to concurrently throughout the entire 
processes of the SDFIPM. 
 
3.8.7 Maintain a Detailed Documentation 
It is extremely important to document all the activities carried out throughout the 
entire investigative process in order to enable other investigators to authenticate the 
process and results. As well as being incorporated as a single Phase, documentation 
has also been incorporated into the SDFIPM as an Overriding Principle, namely 
Maintain a Detailed Documentation, that will need to be applied throughout the 
whole investigative process. The aim of this Overriding Principle is to record all 
information applicable or produced during the investigative process to support de-
cision making and the legal, administrative processing of those decisions. This 
Overriding Principle involves documenting both physical and digital crime scene. 
For instance, documentation of the physical crime scene involves creating sketches 
and making video of a physical crime scene, while documentation of digital crime 
scene involves investigators properly documenting each item of digital evidence 
when it is discovered. 
 
3.8.8 Interact with Physical Investigation 
A digital investigation and a physical investigation are often interrelated and de-
pendent on one another [35]. In cases where a physical investigation requires an 
assistance from a digital investigation, an example can be to use a digital forensic 
investigation to reveal communications between terror suspects via computers, mo-
bile phones, online social network activities, email communication, communication 
via chat rooms and forums, etc. [9, 10] [15].  An example of digital investigation 
being dependent on a physical investigation is when a suspect is interviewed to pro-
vide a password to a system under investigation [15]. In the SDFIPM, Interact with 
Physical Investigation has been included as an Overriding Principle since defining 
the relationship between a digital investigation and a physical investigation is re-
quired to preserve chain of custody, preserve the integrity of the digital evidence, 







This paper covered the Design and Development of our Advanced Investigative 
Process Model (SDFIPM) for conducting digital forensic examination of digital ev-
idence after it has been identified and acquired. It is argued that the SDFIPM is the 
most comprehensive, detailed and structured DFIPM presented to date.  Each Pro-
cess of the model was discussed and justified. Due to its top-down approach, an 
overview of the model was firstly formulated specifying the first-level components, 
i.e. Processes.  Each first-level component was further broken down to specify the 
second-level components, i.e. Phases.  In turn, each second-level component was 
further refined in greater details to specify the third-level components, namely Sub-
Phases. The SDFIPM is also both generic and formal, enabling DFIs to reach con-
clusions that are reliable, repeatable and well-documented. Due to its scientific ap-
proach, the SDFIPM will enable DFIs to follow a uniform approach, to overcome 
biased and predetermined theories, and authenticate their discoveries by attempting 
to prove themselves wrong. This, in turn, will result in well-established conclusions 
that support expert testimony in courts of law. 
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